For Vijay Bahuguna, who will soon become ex-Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, the Congress High Command taketh brutally as it giveth generously. Bahuguna cannot complain that the decision to oust him from the top job in the hill state was taken in the environs of 10, Janpath and not by the party MLAs in the state capital, Dehradun. That is because the decision to appoint him Chief Minister (in March 2012) was equally made in New Delhi, then simply rubber stamped by the elected representatives of the Congress party in the state, the majority of who were believed to be in favour of Harish Rawat, MP from Haridwar and a genuine mass leader.
Now, as the Congress faces a rout in all five of the state's Lok Sabha seats come April (the grand old party actually won all five in 2009), the High Command is rethinking the wisdom of its wisdom of not so long ago. The rethink is a severe indictment of its March 2012 decision.
At that time, the Congress had only just edged the BJP into first place in the Assembly election, still four seats short of a majority. That support materialised in the form of the BSP and Uttarakhand Kranti Dal and the Congress was set to return to power in the state after five years.
With a favour-thin majority, it would need a canny and highly competent politician to run an effective Government. Vijay Bahuguna did not fit the bill any which way – he did not have ministerial experience, he was not a mass leader, he had only been a Lok Sabha MP from the state for five years, he did not enjoy the confidence of the MLAs and there were question marks over his integrity – he had resigned as a Judge from the Allahabad High Court in controversial circumstances.. In comparison, Harish Rawat was a union minister, a mass leader, was first elected to Parliament in the 1980s, had the confidence of a majority of MLAs, and possessed a clean image.
Yet, the High Command chose Bahuguna, apparently for his loyalty to the First Family, but probably as much for the fact that (unlike Harish Rawat) he commanded no support base outside 10, Janpath – he would therefore be under the High Command's thumb. Unsurprisingly, Bauguna accumulated unpopularity at the rate of knots. In the by-election to the Tehri Garhwal Lok Sabha seat (which he vacated to become CM), held just six months after he took office, his son Saket (whose candidature was presumably endorsed by the High Command) was defeated by a BJP candidate.
Still, Bahuguna was persisted with. His incompetence was magnified by the state's inept response to the Kedarnath floods tragedy. But he was kept in office until now, when it has become abundantly clear that his continuation will ensure a humiliating defeat for Congress in the Lok Sabha polls. The fact is that loyalty or malleability is no substitute for competence and popularity.
The High Command culture struggles to recognise this new reality of Indian politics. If the High Command had learnt its lesson, it would allow the next CM to be chosen in an open election by MLAs. But that isn't going to happen. In any case, it would be an injustice to Harish Rawat if he was now 'chosen' by the High Command rather than 'elected' by the MLAs. And if the successor to Bahuguna is not Rawat but another handpicked nominee of the First Family, then the Congress will continue to suffer.
The only Congress Chief Minister to have bucked this trend of being anointed by Delhi is Siddaramaiah, the Karnataka Chief Minister who more or less appointed himself after soliciting the support of a majority of MLAs. That he was until not so long ago in the Janata Dal, probably explains why he hasn't entirely imbibed the High Command culture.
If the Congress wants to survive as a national party that is also relevant in the states, it needs to abandon the Vijay Bahuguna model of nomination state leaders. Rahul Gandhi claims that only elected MPs have the right to choose a PM candidate. Why does the same logic not apply, in an honest (not rubber stamp) spirit, to MLAs?
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